Reinterpretasi Teori Agency dalam Perspektif Fiqh Ekonomi Islam: Prinsip Amanah, Akuntabilitas, dan Keadilan dalam Relasi Keagenan

Abstract

Penelitian ini bertujuan mereinterpretasi teori agency konvensional melalui perspektif Fiqh Ekonomi Islam guna menjawab kelemahan struktural dan etis dalam relasi principal–agent, khususnya terkait moral hazard, adverse selection, dan asimetri informasi. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif deskriptif dengan analisis normatif melalui telaah literatur klasik dan kontemporer mengenai teori agency, prinsip Fiqh Muamalah, serta praktik tata kelola lembaga keuangan syariah.Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa teori agency konvensional tidak sepenuhnya sesuai dengan kerangka nilai Islam karena hanya bertumpu pada rasionalitas individual dan kepentingan pribadi. Sebaliknya, Fiqh Ekonomi Islam menekankan amanah, keadilan, akuntabilitas, dan maslahah sebagai landasan relasi keagenan. Akad-akad syariah seperti mudharabah, musyarakah, wakalah, ju‘alah, dan ijarah terbukti mengandung struktur pembagian risiko dan insentif yang lebih selaras dengan nilai syariah dibandingkan kontrak konvensional.Pembahasan memperlihatkan bahwa integrasi antara desain kontrak yang jelas, penguatan institusi pengawasan syariah, dan internalisasi nilai-nilai etik mampu menghasilkan model keagenan syariah yang lebih stabil, transparan, dan efektif dalam mengurangi perilaku oportunistik. Temuan ini memberikan kontribusi teoretis bagi pengembangan model agency berbasis nilai dalam ekonomi Islam.

This study aims to reinterpret conventional agency theory through the perspective of Islamic Economic Jurisprudence (Fiqh al-Muamalah) in order to address its structural and ethical limitations, particularly regarding moral hazard, adverse selection, and information asymmetry within principal–agent relationships. The research employs a descriptive qualitative method with a normative analytical approach by reviewing classical and contemporary literature on agency theory, Islamic commercial law, and governance practices in Islamic financial institutions. The findings indicate that conventional agency theory is not fully compatible with Islamic norms because it relies heavily on individual rationality, self-interest, and mechanistic contractual mechanisms. In contrast, Islamic Economic Jurisprudence emphasizes trust (amanah), justice, accountability, and maslahah as the normative foundations of agency relationships. Islamic contracts such as mudarabah, musyarakah, wakalah, ju‘alah, and ijarah offer risk-sharing structures and incentive mechanisms that are more aligned with Sharia principles than conventional contracts. The discussion reveals that integrating clear contract design, strong Sharia governance institutions, and the internalization of ethical values can produce a Sharia-based agency model that is more stable, transparent, and effective in reducing opportunistic behavior. These findings contribute theoretically to developing a value-based agency framework within Islamic economics.