Political Dynamics and Constitutional Non-Compliance in the Implementation of Constitutional Court Decisions in Indonesia

Abstract

The core legal issue addressed in this study is the persistent ineffectiveness of implementing Constitutional Court decisions within Indonesia’s legal and political system, despite their final and binding nature. This research aims to analyze the factors causing such ineffectiveness, particularly in relation to legislative compliance by the House of Representatives and the Government. This study employs normative juridical research. The results reveal that the implementation of Constitutional Court decisions is significantly hindered by dominant political and economic interests within the legislative process, which often override constitutional mandates. Additionally, the absence of clear executorial mechanisms and enforceable legal sanctions contributes to weak compliance, allowing state institutions to delay or even ignore judicial rulings. The case of Decision No. 91/PUU-XVIII/2020 on the Job Creation Law illustrates how legislative actors strategically reinterpret or partially implement decisions, thereby undermining constitutional supremacy. This condition leads to legal uncertainty, disrupts the balance of power among state institutions, and gradually weakens the authority and legitimacy of the Constitutional Court. Therefore, strengthening institutional oversight, establishing binding execution mechanisms, and reforming legislative legal politics are essential to ensure the effective implementation of Constitutional Court decisions in Indonesia.