Institutional Impunity and the Absence of Penal Sanctions as Drivers of Legislative Avoidance in Constitutional Court Rulings

Abstract

This study analyzes structural institutional impunity and the lack of enforceable penal sanctions that drive state institutions' noncompliance with Constitutional Court decisions in Indonesia. The core legal issue is the persistent gap between the final, binding nature of constitutional rulings and the reality of legislative evasion, where pragmatic interests override constitutional mandates without legal deterrence. Employing a normative legal research method supported by a socio-legal approach, the study evaluates institutional defiance through a penal policy and public accountability perspective. The results reveal that legislative compliance is mostly symbolic rather than substantive, representing legislative avoidance to safeguard political and economic agendas in the absence of criminal or severe administrative penalties. This non-compliance is structurally facilitated by the total absence of executorial enforcement mechanisms and enforceable legal sanctions within the national constitutional framework. An empirical examination of Decision No. 91/PUU-XVIII/2020 concerning the Job Creation Law illustrates how legislative actors utilize procedural maneuvers to bypass substantive constitutional rectifications. Consequently, this persistent defiance shifts the state framework from constitutional supremacy to political supremacy, degrading institutional legitimacy. Addressing this crisis requires reforming legislative legal politics, adopting a robust penal policy, and establishing strict executorial mechanisms and legal sanctions to ensure absolute institutional compliance.

Keywords: Constitutional Court; Legislative Compliance; Institutional Impunity; Penal Sanctions; Legal Politics